**Abstract**

The string of English words 'Caesar is a prime number' is not a false proposition but a meaningless 'pseudo-proposition' iff the string of words 'Caesar is identical to 3' is meaningless (§1). As the latter cannot be analysed as a sound identity-proposition, both strings of words need to be considered meaningless, and so Caesar and the number 3 differ non-numerically or' categorially'. Generally speaking: *Whatever does not fall under a common sortal concept that allows individual binding and, thus, individuation and counting, differs categorially* (§2). Although the distinction between numerical and categorial non-identity touches many problems of great philosophical import (§3), there is only space to discuss, in a cursory way, its – often neglected – relevance to the diverse body-mind problems (§4).

## 1. Categorial non-identity and 'category-mistakes'

*1.1.* In quite a number of earlier publications, the senior author made ample use of the concept or, better perhaps, the relation of what we suggest to dub 'categorial' non-identity.[1] We have called this sort of a non-identity, difference or divergence a '*categorial*' one because it is closely related to the 'categories' or '[logical] types' that are constitutive of Gilbert Ryle's so-called 'category-mistakes' (see esp. Ryle 1938; 1949, passim). In his early paper of 1938, Ryle explained his concept of a category-mistake by a method of substitution-tests, namely, by replacing one or more constituent parts of a true or false and hence meaningful sentence with a gap-sign and then deliberately trying to replenish the resulting 'sentence-frame' or 'skeleton sentence' (Ryle 1938: 176 fn.; 1945: 209) – say, '… is in bed' – so as to produce nonsense, in this case, for instance, the string of words

(1.1.1)   Saturday is in bed.

Obviously, this string of English words would only be meaningful if the term 'Saturday' were understood, not in the most straightforward way as referring to a day of the week, but as a grammatically proper name for some material object, notably a human, canine or feline animal (think, for example, of Robinson Crusoe's mate Friday, so called after the day they first met).

When a sentence is (not true or false but) nonsensical or absurd,[2] although its vocabulary is conventional and its grammatical construction is regular, we say that it is absurd because at

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[1] See esp. Hoche 1990: Ch. 11; 2008: Essay III ('Identity-statements and nonsense'). – We are going to leave it an open question whether we had better speak, in this case, of a ('polyadic') relation or of a ('monadic') concept; for as we'll see in due course, 'numerality' is basically foreign to categorial non-identity. Nonetheless, we cannot always dispense with such 'number-loaded' wordings as 'categorially different from *each other*' or 'categorial difference *between*', which imply 'two-ness'. In fact, the ingrained habits of ordinary language cannot at all easily be adapted to categorial (that is, non-numerical) non-identity, and this makes it difficult to get a clear view on the problem in the first place. So the following considerations once again confirm the well-known view, dating back to Frege and Wittgenstein, that philosophizing often amounts to struggling with language (for details, see Hoche/Strube 1985: 42–48).

[2] Nowadays, in technical language, logicians use to equate 'absurd' not with 'nonsensical' but rather with 'self-contradictory', that is, 'logically false'.

least one ingredient expression in it is not of the right type to be coupled or to be coupled in that way with the other ingredient expression or expressions in it. (Ryle 1938: 179)

*1.2.* In the 1930-s, such substitution-tests were rather well-known. In a more indirect but, I think, at the same time also more explicative way, Rudolf Carnap (1931: § 4) virtually anticipated Ryle 1938 by defending the position that the string of words

(1.2.1)   Caesar is a prime number

is not a false proposition but a nonsensical '*pseudo-proposition*' ('*Scheinsatz*'). He did so by arguing that '(being a) prime number' is a property of numbers which can neither be ascribed to, nor denied, a person, and by adding that an expression of the form

(1.2.2)   *a* is a prime number

yields a false proposition if and only if (henceforth: iff) *a* can be divided by a natural number which is neither *a* nor 1. On these grounds, Carnap (1931: 228) thought it '*obvious*' ('*offenbar*') that *a* cannot be replaced with the personal name '[Gaius Julius] Caesar'.

*1.3.* For at least the following reason, however, we don't find the last remark of Carnap's really '*obvious*'. For if it were, the concept of *categorial non-identity*, which we are about to scrutinize in the present article, would be a matter of course, which in fact it is not at all. To elucidate this connection, let us attend to the logical fact that (1.2.1), provided it has a genuine sense at all, means neither more nor less than

(1.3.1)   There is (exactly) one prime number Caesar is identical to,

which, for its part, can at best mean as much as the countably infinite (pseudo-)disjunction[3]

(1.3.2)   Either Caesar is identical to the number 2, or Caesar is identical to the number 3, or Caesar is identical to the number 5, or Caesar is identical to the number 7, or […], and so on.

For this reason, (1.2.1) is meaningless iff (1.3.2) is meaningless. Again, pursuant to elementary logic, (1.3.2) is meaningless iff it includes *at least one* meaningless disjunct. Furthermore, as none of the disjuncts differs from any of the others in any logically relevant respect, by 'parity of reasoning' we may conclude that (1.3.2) contains *at least one* meaningless disjunct iff *all* of its disjuncts lack a genuine meaning. Hence, say,

(1.3.3)   Caesar is identical to the number 3

is meaningless iff (1.2.1) is meaningless. From this it follows that, on Moore's 'see-saw' principle (see, e.g., 1925: 40), we are free to confirm the meaninglessness of (1.2.1) – and, for that matter, of (1.1.1) – by arguing that (1.3.3) is meaningless (and not false), or *vice versa*. We take the former way of argumentation to be more promising.

## 2. A Russell style interpretation of identity-statements as a criterion for distinguishing between categorial and numerical non-identity

*2.1.* For *some* purposes, the authors find the (neo-) *Fregean* analysis of identity-statements recently propounded by them (Hoche/Knoop 2017) highly illuminating; for *others*, however –

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[3] For a discussion of some logical subtleties, see Hoche 2008: 103 fn. 4.

notably for the present purpose of defending the soundness and indispensability of the concept of a categorial *vs.* a numerical non-identity –, an analysis along *Russellian* lines is certainly preferable.[4] On Russell's theory of definite descriptions,[5] which can easily be confirmed by a set of independent idiolectal assenting-tests,[6] and a defensible view on grammatically proper names (as opposed to mere name-radicals of a given natural language),[7] a true or false statement of numerical identity such as

> (2.1.1)   Benjamin Franklin is identical to the first US ambassador to Paris.

can be analysed, *inter alia*, as the (*sit venia verbo*) 'three- member conjunction'

> (2.1.1')   There is exactly one person whom, in educated contemporary non-subcultural circles, we use to refer to by the name-radical 'Benjamin Franklin', and there is exactly one person who is a first US ambassador to Paris, and there is at least one person whom, in educated contemporary non-subcultural circles, we use to  refer to  by the name- radical 'Benjamin Franklin' and who is a first US ambassador to Paris.

*2.2.* If we try to apply this Russell style analysis of sound identity-statements to the questionable string of words (1.3.3), we find ourselves at a loss what expression to substitute for the word 'person' just three times used in the analysans (2.1.1').[8] The predicate or concept-word (Frege: 'Begriffswort') '($x$ is a) person' won't do; for the number 3 is not a person; nor will the concept-word '($x$ is a) number' do; for [Gaius Julius] Caesar is not a number. So it seems that we have to look for a denotation of a concept (*genus*) to which the concepts (*species*) *person* and *number* are both of them subordinated. At first sight, one might be tempted to believe that the simplest predicate to meet this condition is the artificially synthesized neologism '($x$ is a) nerson' – or, for

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[4] We take it, of course, that the two interpretations can be shown to be logically equivalent to each other; see Hoche 2014: §§ 3-4.

[5] See esp. Russell 1905: 51, 55; 1911: 159; Whitehead/Russell 1910: 'Introduction', 23, 30 f., 66–71, and *14 ('Descriptions', 173–186). Cf. also Wiggins 1965: sect. VII.

[6] Assenting or combination tests of the rough-and-ready form 'It is impossible to assent to *p* and dissent from *q* (in the same breath); hence *p* logically entails *q*' have frequently been used in linguistic philosophy, notably by Richard M. Hare. But in this simple form, the tests do not allow for the important distinction between logical entailment and, *inter alia*, pragmatic implication, which is akin to 'Moore's paradox'. For it is impossible to assent, say, to 'I believe it is raining.' and dissent from 'It is raining.', and yet my belief that it is raining doesn't entail that it is in fact raining. The successful rectification of the misshapen wording of assenting tests turned out to be unexpectedly cumbersome: see Hoche 1981; 2008: Essays I and II.

[7] It is a logically as well as practically consequential myth that grammatically proper names don't belong to a given natural language and, for this reason, need not or even should not be listed in dictionaries. Unfortunately, this is in fact often neglected, and hence sometimes it is rather time-consuming to find, say, the Greek, French, or German counterparts of such English names as 'Aristotle'. What is worse: Unless we couldn't distinguish between the uninterpreted English name (or, better perhaps: 'name-radical') 'Aristotle' and its being actually used either in contemporary non-subcultural educated English speaking circles or else in a given subcultural speech-situation, we couldn't consistently develop a fertile linguistic theory of grammatically proper names as the one according to which, very roughly speaking, *the name 'Aristotle' as used in a given speech situation means the same as the 'rigid' definite description 'the entity we refer to, in that speech situation, by the name-radical "Aristotle"*; for quite a number of details and explanations, see Hoche 1985: 5.2; Hoche/Strube 1985: A.I.1.4. Cf. 2.5 with fn. 13, below

[8] As will become obvious in a moment, the necessity to look for such an expression in the first place is due to the linguistic fact that numerals, as well as such relation-words as '(one and) the same as', 'another one than', etc., are 'substantive-hungry'; cf. Austin 1962: Ch. VII, 68–70.

that matter, '(*x* is a) pumber' – in the sense of '(*x* is a) person or a number'. Pursuant to this suggestion, the predicate – if it is in fact one – '(*x* is a) nerson' would amount to the fully written out expression '(*x* is a) person and/or (*x* is a) number'. However, if the result of §1, above, is acceptable, this string of words is meaningless. For according to that result, replacing the free variable *x* with the denotation of either a person or else a number would yield meaninglessness or nonsense, which is due to the fact that *exactly one* of the strings of words flanking the 'and/or' would be meaningless.[9] And, for reasons exactly analogous, replacing the free variable *x* with the denotation of any given object that is neither a person nor a number, say, with the geographical name 'London', wouldn't in the least alter this outcome; only, *both* of the strings of words on the left and on the right of 'and/or' would be void of sense. Nor would a more complicated truth-functionally structured string of words devised along these lines offer any way out, and again for exactly analogous reasons. So, due to the meaninglessness of its third would-be-conjunct, the presently looked-for counterpart (1.3.3') to the analysans (2.1.1') would be nonsensical as a whole, and hence the analysandum (1.3.3) cannot be analysed along the tried and tested Russellian lines.

*2.3.* Still, one last loophole of a somewhat different sort might perhaps be thought to offer itself, namely, resorting to *purely formal or non-material concepts* and their denotations, such as 'item', 'entity', 'object' or 'thing'. Purely formal concepts, however, have nothing to do with *species* and *genera*, and, instead of the concept of *generalization*, in their case the concept of *formalization* comes into play. Furthermore, purely formal concepts are neither sortal nor open to what me way call 'individual binding', that is, able to be restricted by such spatio-temporal restrictions as 'in UK in 2019' or such arithmetical restrictions as '<100'.[10] For this reason, as has been known at the latest since Frege (1884, trans. 1950), in counting (and even: identifying)[11] objects, and hence also in speaking of 'exactly one' or 'at least one', we cannot possibly do without material (non-formal) concepts.

*2.4*. Hence, for want, first, of a suitable concept-word and, second, of an alternative analysans, which is certainly not in sight, the result of §1, above – namely, that the string of words

   (1.3.3)   Caesar is identical to the number 3

and its ilk need to be considered void of meaning rather than false – has anew been corroborated. At the same time, the preceding considerations give us a chance to work out a general criterion for deciding whether any given entity *a* and any given entity *b* stand in a *numerical* relation, i.e., are *one* (and the same) or else *two* objects, or not, i.e., differ *categorially*. As the positive concept of a 'categorial identity' seems to us to be of little or no use, let us confine ourselves to defining the concept of 'categorial non-identity', and let us suggest the following definition: *Whatever does not fall under a common sortal concept that allows individual binding and, thus, individuation and*

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[9] In this case, we cannot even use the technical terms 'adjunctor', 'adjunct' and 'adjunction'; for the classical or two-valued (bivalent) propositional calculus is restricted to true or false, hence in either case meaningful, expressions, and resorting to a many-valued, say, trivalent, logic seems to us to make all too light of the basic and, we take it, philosophically extremely fertile difference between sense and nonsense.

[10] For details, see Hoche 2008a: III.4-5.

[11] See Hoche 1975, trans. 1983.

*counting, is neither numerically identical nor numerically non-identical but categorially non-identical.* Or, in other words: *It belongs to (numerically) different logical types or categories*.[12]

### 3. Where categorial non-identity seems to matter

The categorial non-identity or type-difference between *persons* on the one hand and *days of the week* or else (natural or other) *numbers* on the other is not much of a problem; for hardly anyone will ever feel tempted to believe otherwise. But what about the ubiquitous relations between wholes and their parts (see also 4.4, below), say, between my right arm and my right hand or between Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Wittgenstein of the *Tractatus*? Or, to turn to philosophically more intriguing questions: What about relations between such entities as *expressions* (say, grammatically proper names[13] or sentences) *of a given language* on the one hand and *expressions as being used in a given speech-situation* on the other? Or between *real objects* and *counterfactually possible objects*, or else *purely possible* or *imagined (quasi-) objects*, or else *intentional objects* (i.e., *subjective referents*) such as *belief-objects* of different people? The underlying conceptual distinctions cannot be dismissed any longer in general linguistics and in the philosophies of language and mind, and so we need to allow for these questions as much as, in modern micro-physics, for the closely related but much better known wave-particle-problem and similar aspects of Bohr's properly conceived concept of 'complementarity' and Heisenberg's 'uncertainty relation'. Nonetheless, in this paper we do not intend to even start discussing all these questions. Rather, in the rest of the present article, we will confine ourselves to concisely dealing with the multifaceted 'mind-body problem', notably *that* of its variants which, though being strictly speaking void of meaning, as a rule immediately obtrudes itself as soon as we ask ourselves how 'the human body' and 'the human mind' are related to each other.

### 4. The 'mind-body problem'

*4.1.* In the concluding sentence of §3, we put the terms '(the) mind-body problem', 'the human body' and 'the human mind' in scare quotes in order to call attention to a striking feature these terms have in common, namely, to the frequently overlooked fact that each of them needs to be acknowledged as an *umbrella word*, i.e., a word that stands for more than only one item.

*4.1.1*. To begin with, the term '*the human body*' can stand, either for a given person *a*'s body *qua* being perceived, observed or otherwise cognized by *a* himself or herself, or else for *a*'s body *qua* being perceived or observed by (anyone of) *a*'s fellow men. In so saying, we take it that I am aware of my own body in a way clearly differing from the way I am aware of the body of a fellow man or, for that matter, of an animal or any other material object whatsoever. To be sure, I can see large parts of my own body in very much the way I see others; but there are well-known limits to this approach (even in case we take refuge to looking glasses or monitors), and, more important yet, there are *specific* modes of my awareness of *my own* body, say, pains, kinaesthesia, dizziness, nausea, and so on.

*4.1.2*. Similarly, the term '*the human mind*' can stand, either for respectively my own mind or consciousness, say, my own seeing, smelling, believing, fearing or hoping something, or else for the homonymous conscious experiences of other humans and, to a limited extent, non-human

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[12] Cf. Hoche 1990: 6.8.

[13] See *2.1* with fn. 7, above.

animals. It can hardly be denied that, for instance, my mode of ascertaining what I see, believe, or fear myself greatly differs from my mode of ascertaining what my neighbour sees or my dog is expecting or afraid of, and so the fact that *in everyday life* we use the same terms for conscious experiences of respectively myself and of others surely deserves to be scrutinized without prejudice in *philosophical anthropology*. For here, and likewise in the case of 'the human body' touched on in 4.1.1, certainly it would be naïve to take it that such fundamental differences in cognitively approaching an entity should be ontologically irrelevant.

*4.1.3*. Consequently, the term '*the mind-body problem*' can refer to no less than four different questions that at first sight might seem to be reasonable. First: How is *a*'s body *qua* accessed by *a* related to *a*'s mind *qua* accessed by *a*? Second: How is *a*'s body *qua* accessed by *b* related to *a*'s mind *qua* accessed by *b*? Third: How is *a*'s body *qua* accessed by *a* related to *a*'s mind *qua* accessed by *b*? And fourth: How is *a*'s mind *qua* accessed by *a* related to *a*'s body *qua* accessed by *b*?

*4.2.* The first of the four questions just distinguished in 4.1.3 has been largely discussed, under the catchword of the bodiliness or embodiment (German: "Leiblichkeit") of respectively my own consciousness, by phenomenologists[14] as well as by Wittgenstein, who once or twice (I forget, where) aptly called the functioning body latently present in respectively my own conscious events my 'geometric eye'. As to the second question, it gave rise to the psychological movement of 'behaviourism', which nowadays is widely considered outdated – though, we think, by way of throwing out the baby with the bath water; for, with respect to '*other* minds', that is, the consciousness of others *qua* approached by respectively myself, we take it to be the specific, nay, the only rationally defensible approach.[15] As to the third question, to the best of our knowledge, it has never been attended to, and, we take it, rightly so; for it would be utterly futile to look for any relations between the phenomenological bodiliness of consciousness and bodily behaviour.

*4.3.* The fourth question, however, seems to us to be the most remarkable one; for it is the *first* and by and large the *only* one to come to the fore whenever the bulk of natural scientists and also many a philosopher start discussing 'the mind-body problem', which then they unawares and illegitimately reduce to the mind-matter problem. With a view to this observation, Jean-Paul Sartre (1943: 365, 367) sarcastically spoke of the misguided and hopeless attempt to join *my own* conscious experience to *another* person's material body. To be sure, there is a very strong psychological motive for this philosophical *faux pas*: Experience teaches that, whenever we interest ourselves for 'the mind-body problem', it is natural to start by exclusively focussing on respectively *my own consciousness* on the one hand and *somebody else's body* on the other; and this empirical observation may easily be explained by the fact that, as a rule at least and certainly at first sight, we tend to think of *ourselves as minds* and of *others as bodies*. So, in this sense, and with a grain of salt, we may perhaps roughly say that *I am a mind having a body*, whereas *somebody (!) else is a body having a mind*.

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[14] According to Husserl, my orientation is always related to my functioning body, i.e., to my body for myself, which functions as a zero-point of orientation, or a zero-entity. See, e.g., Husserl 1925: p. 157: ‚Alle Orientierung ist […] bezogen auf einen Nullpunkt der Orientierung, oder ein Nullding, als welches mein, des Wahrnehmenden, Eigenleib fungiert.'

[15] Unfortunately, Max Velmans (2007: 421), utterly unaware of the problems we just touched, couldn't help making fun of this, we take it, defensible if not downright required 'semi-behaviourism'.

*4.4.* Now let us compare our arguments, offered in 4.1, above, that the terms 'the human mind' and 'the human body' are *umbrella terms* with the definition of categorial distinctness offered in 2.4, above, which may also be given the wording that whatever cannot be referred to by at least one common *sortal term* that allows counting differs, not numerically, but categorially. Then we can easily convince ourselves that someone else's body for me and my own consciousness for myself do not fall under a common 'counting concept', and hence that not a numerical but a categorial distinction is involved. In this case, which we already characterized as being highly obtrusive and yet nonsensical (see 4.3, above), we are confronted with a relation analogous to the one between Caesar and the number Three (see 1.2–1.3, above). As to the relations between someone else's body for me and their consciousness for me as well as between my own body for myself and my own consciousness for myself, i.e., the ones having to do with psychological behaviourism and with the bodiliness of my own consciousness, respectively (see 4.2, above), things are more complicated. We tend to believe that here we have to do with part-whole relations comparable to the ones between my right hand and my right arm or between Wittgenstein and the young Wittgenstein (see §3, above) on the one hand and with part-part relations on the other. The latter ones seem to us to be partly analogous to the relation between, say, a leg and the top of a table, which, we think, clearly differ *numerically*, and partly to the relation between the shape and the colour of a material object, of which, at the very least, this is much less obvious.

*4.5.* To be sure, all these considerations are in need of being extended in a whole array of directions, and much of this work has in fact been already done (see, e.g. Hoche 1995; 2007; 2008). For the purpose at hand, however, suffice it to say that dealing with 'the mind-body problem' without allowing for the paradigm of *categorial non-identity*, which opens up a way towards a more satisfying alternative to the barren dichotomy of *monistic* and *dualistic* solutions of 'the mind-body problem', would amount to staying far behind the present state of the art.[16]

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[16] To my deepest regret, I have to inform the public that my long-standing junior coauthor and friend, Michael Knoop, M.A., died on May 21, 2019. I am extremely grateful to him for many valuable contributions, especially in the fields of formal logics and linguistic philosophy, to our common research work.

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